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INTRODUCTION 
Included in this Addendum are the fundamental documents 
reflecting the decision of the Third District Court. Also 
included are reproductions of the relevant Jury Instructions, 
Special Verdict Form, and statutes, rules, and constitutional 
provisions. All references to statutes are to Utah Code Ann., 
1953, as amended. 
All of the statutes reproduced are the versions in effect 
during the time period of August, 1987 through January, 1988. 
Some portions of the relevant statutes and constitutional provi-
sions have been omitted for the convenience of the court as 
irrelevant to the issues presented. 
All of the printed material included in this Addendum has 
been reproduced from the Utah Code Ann. published by the Michie 
Company. 
DATED this 11 day of September, 1992. 
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GREGORY CE//SANDERS, ESQ. 
KIRK G. GIBBS, ESQ. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N. ELDON BARNES, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 900901405 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 24th of 
May, 1991. At the conclusion of the evidence and at the 
request of counsel, the matter was set for final closing 
argument August 13, 1991. 
At trial, the plaintiff/petitioner was present and 
represented by his attorneys Gregory J. Sanders, and Ronald J. 
Yengich, Director of the Rocky Mountain Defense Fund as 
associated counsel. The State was represented by its counsel, 
Ms. Charlene Barlow and Kirk M. Torgensen. The parties having 
submitted their respective pleadings and the Court now being 
fully advised, makes this its: 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL FACTS 
1. On March 8, 1990, the plaintiff, pro se, filed a 
Complaint for habeas corpus relief, 
2. The Court set a pre-hearing conference for March 16, 
1990, on which day the State filed its Answer. 
3. The Court then discussed with the petitioner, 
appearing pro se the appointment of counsel and the future 
scheduling of proceedings, and stayed the execution date then 
set for April 30, 1990. 
4. The Court appointed Messrs. Sanders and Yengich on May 
2, 1990, and requested that they review the case and consider 
filing an Amended Petition. An Amended Petition was filed on 
the 22nd of October, 1990. (NOTE: The Court wishes to note 
here an expression of appreciation to each counsel for the 
petitioner, whose appearance and participation was pro bono. 
This effort by counsel represents the finest evidence of 
charitable legal work well beyond that which might be 
expected.) 
5. This case was reviewed by the Utah State Supreme Court 
on direct appeal in the case of State v. Joseph Mitchell 
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Parsons, 781 P. 2d 1275, decided October 13, 1989. Thereafter a 
rehearing was denied on January 22, 1990. Before the Supreme 
Court in the appeal, the petitioner was represented by his 
defense attorney who assisted him in the trial and appeal of 
the original case. 
Petitioner has exhausted his appellate remedies and now 
seeks relief through this Petition for Habeas Corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO THE OFFENSE 
6. Upon a plea of guilty, the defendant was convicted of 
Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense, in violation of 
Section 76-5-202 (1978, Supp. 1989). The Court thereafter 
conducted a sentencing proceeding in harmony with Section 
76-3-207 (1978, Supp. 1989), and the jury unanimously concluded 
the death penalty was appropriate and such was ordered by the 
trial judge. 
7. The criminal offense occurred in late afternoon on 
August 30, 1987. The defendant had been hitchhiking on 
Interstate 15 near Barstow, California. The victim, Richard L. 
Ernest, offered a ride to Mr. Parsons. Mr. Ernest agreed to 
take the petitioner to Denver, Colorado. 
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8. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 31, 1987, the 
petitioner and Mr. Ernest drove into the Lunt Park rest area on 
Interstate 15 near Cedar City. Mr. Ernest stated he was too 
tired to continue driving, and stopped for some sleep. The 
petitioner claims that Mr. Ernest made a homosexual advance, to 
which the petitioner responded, "That's not my style,11 and 
requested to be left alone. Again, according to the 
petitioner, when Mr. Ernest made a second advance, the 
petitioner pulled from his sock a five inch double-edged knife 
and stabbed Mr. Ernest in the chest, rendering multiple blows 
which were fatal. 
9. The petitioner then drove Mr. Ernest's vehicle away 
from the rest stop, pulled over on the shoulder of the highway, 
and pushed Mr. Ernest's body out of the car covering it with a 
sleeping bag. 
10. The petitioner then drove to Beaver, Utah, where he 
changed his clothes, washed the victim's blood from himself and 
from the inside of the vehicle, and emptied personal belongings 
and carpentry tools of the victim into a dumpster. He 
thereafter assumed the victim's identity, purchasing food, gas, 
etc. with Mr. Ernest's credit cards. 
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11. Law enforcement officers, thereafter, having been 
alerted to the credit card transactions and the unusual 
activities at the service station in Beaver, and later having 
found the victim's body, were able at approximately 4:15 p.m. 
on August 31, to apprehend the petitioner at a rest area on 
Interstate 70. 
12. Thereafter, as stated earlier, the defendant pled 
guilty to Capital Homicide. The penalty portion of the 
proceedings ensued wherein the death penalty was ordered. The 
conviction and sentence were appealed and affirmed. 
13. This post-conviction petition was filed, raising the 
following issues: 
ISSUES HEREIN CONSIDERED 
14. The petitioner alleges that his sentence is 
unconstitutional and in violation of the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
Articles I and VII of the Utah Constitution. He specifically 
claims that the assistance of his trial and appellate counsel 
was ineffective, justifying relief for the following alleged 
deficiencies: 
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A. There was insufficient investigation of the offense 
and particularly the penalty evidence to mitigate the 
petitioner's conduct. 
B. Counsel erred in allowing his client to plead guilty 
to Capital Homicide rather than directly trying the case. 
C. Counsel erred in failing to prepare expert 
psychological witnesses for the defense in sentencing. 
D. Counsel erred in failing to exclude a juror who 
communicated with a witness in the courthouse during a recess 
of the proceedings. 
E. Counsel erred in failing to request of the court to 
determine if certain jurors had an improper predisposition or 
bias in regard to the death penalty. 
F. Prosecution erred in obtaining significant sworn 
statements or "depositions" of witnesses without notice to 
opposing counsel and in violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
G. Counsel erred in failing to file adequate discovery 
motions. 
H. Counsel erred in failing to advise the petitioner 
regarding his rights at preliminary hearing. 
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I. Counsel erred in failing to meet with the petitioner 
for a sufficient length of time to adequately prepare• 
J. Counsel erred in failing to adequately investigate or 
request the Court inquire of the venire's awareness of media 
reporting of the incidents. 
K. Counsel erred in failing to submit an appropriate 
special verdict form. 
L. Counsel erred in failing to challenge the prosecutor 
for failure to have filed an appropriate bond as required by 
law. 
M. Prosecution erred in failing to provide petitioner 
with compensated counsel in pursuing his rights to 
post-conviction relief. 
15. Based upon the foregoing claims, the State filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and claimed in its 
Memoranda, among other things, that the issues for 
post-conviction relief as stated above could not be considered 
because they could or should have been raised on appeal 
consistent with Utah case law. 
The Court will now address each of the respective claims. 
00255 
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PETITIONER'S CLAIMS COULD OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
RAISED ON APPEAL 
16. The Utah Supreme Court in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 
(Utah 1989), stated that post-conviction relief should be 
sought only in "unusual circumstances" and the majority of 
issues that could or should have been raised on appeal should 
not be re-examined in post-conviction hearings. See also, 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 44 P.2d 968 (1968). 
17. While it would be easy to review the above-stated 
issues as to whether they were available for consideration by 
the Court at the time of appeal and then reject them in that 
they could or should have been raised at that time; 
unfortunately, when the focus of the petitioner's claim is 
stated herein, is on the effectiveness of counsel, and since 
that same counsel handled both the trial and appeal, it seems 
appropriate and equitable that this Court consider those 
arguments on their merits. Therefore, this Court rejects the 
claim that the issues could or should have been raised on 
appeal, and reviews the issues, as follows: 
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A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INVESTIGATION PRIOR TO TRIAL 
18- The petitioner claims that his attorney failed to 
adequately investigate the underlying offense through the use 
of an authorized investigator and/or to seek adequate evidence 
of mitigation for the penalty phase. 
19. Counsel for the defendant testified that he spent 
several hundred hours working on the case. After a review of 
the file and listening to the testimony of the witnesses, the 
Court cannot find any basis upon which the Court could conclude 
that a further investigation would have yielded other 
information that would have affected the result. 
20. The petitioner has further failed to proffer any 
information, including information regarding the alleged 
homosexual encounter or invitation which could cause the Court 
to conclude that the result would be affected in the least. 
21. The Court will not and cannot conclude that further 
investigation would have provided something now not even 
proffered or alleged. To so conclude would cause courts to set 
minimum time allocations for cases to be investigated. That 
would not be an acceptable standard. 
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B. COUNSEL ERRED IN ALLOWING HIS CLIENT TO PLEAD 
GUILTY TO CAPITAL HOMICIDE 
22. The petitioner has continually admitted that he was 
responsible for killing the victim in this case. The 
petitioner himself became frustrated during the course of the 
preliminary hearing. He apparently didn't want to hear the 
evidence, and he requested strongly of his counsel that the 
preliminary hearing terminate. Petitioner was advised that 
that could not occur without the consent of the prosecution, 
and that the prosecution would not consent without a clear, 
unequivocal plea to Capital Homicide. The petitioner 
considered fully that decision, and determined to enter the 
plea. 
23. Not only does an accused individual have the right to 
plead "not guilty," they also have the right to plead 
"guilty." That was done in this case. As a part of the 
legitimate trial strategy, the petitioner determined that it 
would not be to his advantage to have the same jury consider 
both the evidence related to guilt or innocence, and deliberate 
thereon, and thereafter consider the evidence related to 
punishment with a view then toward aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and deliberate thereon. That strategy is a very 
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legitimate strategy which the petitioner elected to make 
knowingly. This Court finds no flaw therein. 
C. COUNSEL ERRED IN FAILURE TO PREPARE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENSE 
24. No testimony was proffered as to the benefits of such 
psychological witnesses, and this Court cannot speculate on the 
result of that failure. This is particularly so when the 
standard required in Strickland is that their must be a 
probability that the result would be in doubt if the error had 
not occurred. I cannot find any basis to so conclude or 
speculate and decline to do so. 
D. COUNSEL ERRED IN FAILURE TO EXCLUDE A JUROR 
WHO COMMUNICATED WITH A WITNESS DURING A RECESS 
25. The Court finds that the conversation between the 
juror and the witness, while unfortunate, was casual and the 
parties were specifically asked whether they continued to raise 
their objection or challenge to that juror. The petitioner and 
his counsel declined to do so. The State in what was described 
as "an abundance of caution" asked that the juror be replaced 
with an alternate, which then the defendant refused. The State 
certainly could not be held to having a defect in its 
A-12 
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conviction and sentence based upon such acquiescence by the 
defendant. 
E. CLAIMED JUROR RELIGIOUS PREDISPOSITION IN 
FAVOR OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
26. This claim was abandoned by the petitioner and 
counsel, and need not be further considered. 
F. THE "DEPOSITIONS" TAKEN WITHOUT NOTICE TO 
OPPOSING COUNSEL 
27. On September 2, the day the Information was filed, and 
only two days after the arrest of the petitioner, a sworn 
statement was taken of the victim's wife, Ms. Beverly Ernest. 
The statement was taken without notice to opposing counsel and 
likely at a time when no counsel had, in fact, been named. 
Later, on September 4, further sworn statements were taken of 
prisoners in the Iron County Jail who had been cellmates with 
the petitioner. 
28. While the statements were called "depositions" when 
they were taken, the prosecutor Mr. Scott Burns testified that 
he did not consider the statements to be formal "depositions" 
and that he had no intention of using the statements in trial. 
This Court finds that these "depositions" were nothing more 
than investigative sworn statements, and in fact worked to the 
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benefit of the petitioner during the course of the penalty 
phase of the trial. It was only the petitioner's counsel who 
used the sworn statements in examining witnesses. 
29. The statements were from the beginning readily 
available to defense counsel, and were only generated in order 
to preserve investigative information. 
30. This Court can find no evidence that the taking of the 
sworn statements in any way affected the testimony of the 
witnesses. There is no evidence that I can see from a review 
of the record that examination as to the victim's alleged 
ownership of the gun, his general relationship with his wife, 
and his having left California with cash failed to create in my 
mind any issues that could have been preserved, enhanced or 
utilized to benefit the petitioner or the State in any other 
way than came forth at trial. Had the witness been more 
closely cross-examined by vigorous defense counsel there would 
have been no change. Thus, I cannot find any factual basis to 
conclude that there was any prejudice as a result of the taking 
of the statement without notice to opposing counsel and the 
petitioner. I find that the statements were not "depositions", 
but were rather "sworn statements" generated by a careful and 
thoughtful investigative prosecutor. 
M261 U ^ M 
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G. COUNSEL FAILED TO FILE ADEQUATE DISCOVERY MOTIONS 
31 • The Court finds this issue to be without merit, there 
is no reason to file a discovery motion, other than out of an 
abundance of caution when the motion would, as in this case, 
yield nothing. The prosecutor had a continual open file policy 
and would often present the defense attorney with information 
simultaneous to receipt of the same by the prosecutor. On many 
occasions each would review new information at the same time. 
No information has been presented by the petitioner to show 
that the discovery motions would have yielded anything. To 
find merit in the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
that basis would cause the Court to speculate well beyond 
appropriate circumstances. 
H. COUNSEL FAILED TO ADVISE THE PETITIONER 
REGARDING HIS RIGHTS FOR WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 
32. The record reveals that the petitioner was adequately 
advised of the consequences of waiving the preliminary 
hearing. It was at the petitioner's insistence that the 
hearing be discontinued and that he be allowed to plead guilty 
to the killing. The petitioner in this court made a full 
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admission to the killing, and has apparently never denied it. 
The waiver of the preliminary hearing on that basis cannot be 
found deficient. The only issues at a preliminary hearing are 
whether (1) there is probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed, and whether (2) there is probable cause to 
believe the individual accused committed the offense. Both of 
those issues were openly, willingly, and knowingly admitted 
throughout the proceedings. 
I. COUNSEL FAILED TO MEET WITH THE PETITIONER FOR A 
SUFFICIENT LENGTH OF TIME TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE 
33. Without a predicate showing that further meetings 
would have yielded information that could cause the Court to 
doubt the quality of the representation and/or the conviction, 
courts should not engage in speculation as to the amount of 
time necessary for counsel and their clients to meet. This 
would require speculation beyond the purview of this Court, and 
beyond that which is appropriate in this case. 
J. COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE 
VENIRE'S AWARENESS OF THE MEDIA REPORTING OF THE INCIDENT 
34. This offense happened in a relatively unpopulated part 
of Utah, where it is natural to expect that many people would 
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have heard of the events• There is, however, no evidence to 
show that further inquiry into the media reporting of the 
events and the venire's knowledge of the same would affect the 
result, thus this issue fails for want of sufficient evidence 
in support. 
K. THE FAILURE TO COUNSEL TO SUBMIT AN APPROPRIATE 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
35. The Special Verdict form utilized by the court has 
been reviewed on appeal by the State Supreme Court and the 
argument has been rejected. I find no basis upon which to 
infer that counsel was ineffective through allowing without 
further objection the same. 
L. COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE PROSECUTOR 
FOR FAILURE TO HAVING FILED THE REQUIRED BOND 
36. There is no basis upon which the Court should grant 
relief for this issue. The bonding of a county prosecutor is 
principally to provide indemnity of the prosecutor to the 
public in the event of some type of malfeasance or 
inappropriate performance in office. Since there is no right 
to relief in this case on that basis, the Court finds the 
petitioner fails for lack of standing to raise the issue. 
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M. THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN PREJUDICED IN PURSUING 
HIS POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DUE TO THE FAILURE TO 
PROVIDE COSTS AND FEES 
37. Unfortunately, this issue remains a legislative 
determination. The petitioner's representation herein was 
superb. This Court has grave concerns that petitioners in 
prison seeking post-conviction relief may not have adequate 
access to counsel to raise issues that appropriately should be 
carefully reviewed by a court. Unfortunately, that assistance 
is not provided at taxpayer's expense, and thus lawyers are 
often constrained to accept the request of a judge to perform 
pro bono services as was done here in significant 
post-conviction cases. This is an unfortunate present 
circumstance, but not a matter for judicial resolution. 
Based upon the foregoing review and analysis of the issues 
submitted by the petitioner in his Petition seeking a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, the Court finds that the same is and should be 
denied. 
Ms. Barlow and Mr. Torgensen are requested to prepare 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order consistent 
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herewith. The Court further orders that in the event this 
matter is not appealed within 30 days as allowed by law, that 
the matter may be certified to the District Court for setting 
of the execution date. 
Dated this /^^ day of December, 1991. 
DAVID S. JTOUNC 
DISTRICT(COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this 7 day of December, 1991: 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Ronald J. Yengich 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Charlene Barlow 
Kirk Torgensen 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Third Judicial District 
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SALT LAK£ COUNTY M^MUNTY 
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Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephones (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
N. ELDON BARNES, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 900901405 
Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on May 24, 1991, and August 13, 1991, before the Honorable David 
S. Young. Petitioner, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, was present and 
represented by Gregory J. Sanders and Ronald J. Yengich. 
Respondent was represented by Charlene Barlow and Kirk Torgensen, 
Assistant Attorneys General. The Court being fully advised in 
the premises hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law as follows: 
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1. That petitioner was hitchhiking on August 30, 1987, 
on Interstate 15 near Barstow, California, when the victim, 
Richard L. Ernest, offered him a ride to Denver, Colorado. 
2. That at approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 31, 1987, 
Mr. Ernest stated that he was too tired to continue driving and 
pulled into the Lunt Park rest area on Interstate 15 near Cedar 
City, Utah. Petitioner claims that Mr. Ernest made a homosexual 
advance, to which the petitioner responded, "That's not my 
style," and requested to be left alone. According to petitioner, 
Mr. Ernest made another sexual advance. In response, petitioner 
pulled a five-inch, double-edged knife from his sock and stabbed 
Mr. Ernest in the chest, administering multiple stab wounds which 
were fatal. 
3. That petitioner drove Mr. Ernest's car away from 
the rest stop, pulled over on the shoulder of the highway, pushed 
Mr. Ernest's body out of the car, and covered it with a sleeping 
bag. 
4. That petitioner drove to Beaver, Utah, where he 
changed his clothes, washed the victim's blood from himself and 
from the inside of the vehicle, and emptied Mr. Ernest's personal 
belongings and carpentry tools into a dumpster. Petitioner then 
1)0268 
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assumed the victim's identity, purchasing food, lodging, gas, 
etc., with Mr. Ernest's credit cards. 
5. That law enforcement officers became alerted to 
petitioner's activities at the service station in Beaver and to 
the credit card transactions. They found Mr. Ernest's body, then 
arrested petitioner at approximately 4:15 p.m. on August 31, 
1987, at a rest area on Interstate 70. 
6. That petitioner was convicted of murder in the 
first degree, a capital offense, upon a plea of guilty. 
7. That after a sentencing hearing, a jury unanimously 
concluded that the death penalty was appropriate and such was 
ordered by the trial judge. 
8. That petitioner's case was reviewed by the Utah 
Supreme Court on direct appeal and was affirmed in State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989); a petition for rehearing was 
denied on January 22, 1990. 
9. That on direct appeal, petitioner was represented 
by his original trial counsel. 
10. That petitioner is currently incarcerated in the 
Utah State Prison. 
11. That petitioner filed a pro se petition for 
postconviction relief on March 8, 1990. 
00270 
n_/i 
12. That the court appointed counsel for petitioner on 
May 2, 1990. 
13. That counsel filed an amended petition on October 
22, 1990. 
14. That in that petition, petitioner alleges that his 
sentence is unconstitutional and violative of the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution 
and articles I and VII of the Utah Constitution. 
15. That petitioner specifically claims that the 
assistance of his trial and appellate counsel was ineffective, 
based on the following alleged deficiencies: 
A. There was insufficient investigation of the offense 
and particularly the penalty evidence to mitigate petitioner's 
conduct. 
B. Counsel erred in allowing his client to plead 
guilty to capital homicide rather than taking the case to trial. 
C. Counsel erred in failing to prepare expert 
psychological witnesses for defense in sentencing. 
D. Counsel erred in failing to exclude a juror who 
communicated with a witness in the courthouse during a recess of 
the proceedings. 
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E. Counsel erred in failing to request of the court to 
determine if certain jurors had an improper predisposition or 
bias with regard to the death penalty. 
F. Prosecution erred in obtaining significant sworn 
statements or "depositions" of witnesses without notice to 
opposing counsel and in violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
G. Counsel erred in failing to file adequate discovery 
motions. 
H. Counsel erred in failing to advise the petitioner 
regarding his rights at preliminary hearing. 
I. Counsel erred in failing to meet with the 
petitioner for a sufficient length of time to adequately prepare. 
J. Counsel erred in failing to adequately investigate 
or request the Court to inquire of the venire's awareness of 
media reporting of the incident. 
K. Counsel erred in failing to submit an appropriate 
special verdict form. 
L. Counsel erred in failing to challenge the 
prosecutor for failing to file an bond as required by law. 
M. Prosecution erred in failing to provide petitioner 
with compensated counsel in pursuing his rights to postconviction 
relief. 
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E. Counsel erred in failing to request of the court to 
determine if certain jurors had an improper predisposition or 
bias with regard to the death penalty. 
F. Prosecution erred in obtaining significant sworn 
statements or "depositions" of witnesses without notice to 
opposing counsel and in violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
G. Counsel erred in failing to file adequate discovery 
motions• 
H. Counsel erred in failing to advise the petitioner 
regarding his rights at preliminary hearing. 
I. Counsel erred in failing to meet with the 
petitioner for a sufficient length of time to adequately prepare. 
J. Counsel erred in failing to adequately investigate 
or request the Court to inquire of the venire's awareness of 
media reporting of the incident. 
K. Counsel erred in failing to submit an appropriate 
special verdict form. 
L. Counsel erred in failing to challenge the 
prosecutor for failing to file an bond as required by law. 
M. Prosecution erred in failing to provide petitioner 
with compensated counsel in pursuing his rights to postconviction 
relief. 
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16. That in response to these claims, respondent filed 
a motion for partial summary judgment and claimed, inter alia, 
that the issues for postconviction relief as stated above could 
not be considered because they could or should have been raised 
on appeal consistent with Utah case law. 
17. That the fact that petitioner has focused upon 
effectiveness of counsel and that the same counsel served 
petitioner for both trial and appeal provides the "unusual 
circumstance" to allow petitioner to raise these issues in a 
postconviction proceeding. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 
1989). 
Taking petitioner's claims in order, the Court finds: 
A. Sufficiency of the investigation prior to trial. 
18. Trial counsel testified that he spent several 
hundred hours working on the case. 
19. After reviewing the file and the testimony, the 
Court cannot find any basis upon which to conclude that a further 
investigation would have yielded other information which would 
have affected the result of petitioner's case. 
20. Petitioner has failed to proffer any information, 
including information regarding the alleged homosexual advance or 
invitation which could cause the Court to conclude that the 
result of this case would have been affected by further investigation. 
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B. Counsel erred in allowing petitioner to plead 
guilty to capital homicide, 
21• Petitioner has continually admitted that he was 
responsible for killing the victim. 
22. Petitioner became frustrated during the course of 
the preliminary hearing because he did not want to hear the 
evidence against him. 
23. Petitioner strongly requested of his counsel that 
the preliminary hearing terminate; he was advised that that could 
not occur without the consent of the prosecution and that the 
prosecution would not consent without a clear, unequivocal plea 
to capital homicide. 
24. Petitioner fully considered the options and 
determined to enter the guilty plea. 
25. It was legitimate trial strategy to decide that it 
was not to petitioner's advantage to have the same jury consider 
both the evidence related to guilt or innocence, and deliberate 
thereon, and then consider the evidence related to punishment and 
deliberate thereon. 
26. Petitioner knowingly chose to plead guilty and 
avoid having the jury consider the evidence to determine guilt or 
innocence. 
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C. Counsel erred in failing to prepare psychological 
witnesses for the defense. 
27. No testimony was proffered as to the benefits of 
such psychological witnesses. 
D. Counsel erred in failing to exclude a juror who 
communicated with a witness during a recess. 
28. The conversation between the juror and the 
witness, while unfortunate, was casual. 
29. The parties were specifically asked by the court 
whether they continued to raise objection to or challenge that 
juror; petitioner, as well as his counsel, declined to do so. 
30. The State, in an abundance of caution, asked that 
the juror be replaced with an alternate; however, defendant 
rejected that request. 
E. Claimed juror religious predisposition in favor 
of the death penalty. 
31. This claim was abandoned by petitioner and his 
counsel at the evidentiary hearing. 
F. The Hdepositions" taken without notice to defense 
counsel. 
32. On September 2, the day the information was filed, 
and only two days after the arrest of petitioner, a sworn 
statement was taken of the victim's wife, Ms. Beverly Ernest. 
00276 
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33. The statement was taken without notice to opposing 
counsel and, in all likelihood, at a time when no counsel had 
been appointed. 
34. On September 4, other sworn statements were taken. 
35. While the statements were called "depositions" 
when they were taken, the prosecutor, Scott Burns, testified that 
he did not consider the statements to be formal "depositions" and 
that he had no intention of using the statements at trial. 
36. These "depositions" were nothing more than 
investigative sworn statements, which, in fact, worked to 
petitioner's benefit when petitioner used them during the course 
of the penalty phase of the proceeding. The statements were only 
used by petitioner's counsel, not by the prosecution. 
37. The statements were available to defense counsel 
from the beginning, and were generated only to preserve 
investigative information. 
38. There is no evidence that the taking of the sworn 
statements in any way affected the testimony of the witnesses. 
39. There is no evidence that examination as to the 
victim's alleged ownership of a gun, his general relationship 
with his wife, and his having left California with cash could 
have preserved, enhanced, or utilized any issue which did not 
already come forth in the proceedings. 
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40. Had the witnesses been closely cross-examined by 
vigorous defense counsel during the taking of the statements 
there would have been no different result. 
41. There was no prejudice to petitioner as a result 
of the taking of the statements without notice to petitioner and 
defense counsel. 
G. Counsel failed to file adequate discovery motions, 
42. There is no reason to file a discovery motion, 
other than out of an abundance of caution, when the motion would, 
as in this case, yield nothing new. 
43. The prosecutor had a continual open file policy 
and would often present defense counsel with information 
simultaneous to receipt of the same by the prosecutor. On many 
occasions both counsel would review new information at the same 
time. 
44. Petitioner has presented no evidence to show that 
formal discovery motions would have yielded anything more than 
the open file policy yielded. 
H. Counsel failed to advise petitioner regarding his 
rights for waiver of preliminary hearing. 
45. The record demonstrates that petitioner was 
adequately advised of the consequences of waiving the preliminary 
hearing. 
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46. It was at petitioner's insistence that the hearing 
be discontinued and that he be allowed to plead guilty to the 
homicide. 
47. At the evidentiary hearing in this matter, 
petitioner again admitted to killing the victim. 
48. The only issues to be resolved at a preliminary 
hearing are whether (1) there is probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed, and (2) there is probable cause to 
believe the individual accused committed the offense; both of 
these issues were openly, willingly, and knowingly admitted by 
petitioner throughout the proceedings. 
I, Counsel failed to meet with the petitioner for a 
sufficient length of time to adequately prepare. 
49. Petitioner has not shown that additional meetings 
between petitioner and his trial counsel would have yielded 
additional information; consequently, petitioner has failed to 
raise doubts about the quality of the representation and/or the 
conviction based on the time spent with trial counsel. 
J. Counsel failed to adequately investigate the 
venire's awareness of the media reporting of 
the incident. 
50. This offense occurred in a relatively unpopulated 
part of Utah; consequently, it may be expected that many people 
would have heard of the events. 
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51. Petitioner has presented no evidence to show that 
further inquiry into the media reporting of the events and the 
venire's knowledge of the same would have affected the result of 
this case. 
K. The failure of counsel to submit an appropriate 
special verdict form. 
52. The special verdict form used by the court in this 
matter was reviewed on appeal by the Utah Supreme Court and 
petitioner's argument was rejected; consequently, failure to 
object to the verdict form did not make counsel ineffective. 
L. Counsel failed to challenge the prosecutor for 
failing to have filed a bond require by law. 
53. The law requiring bonding of a county prosecutor 
has been formulated principally to provide indemnity to the 
public in the event of some type of malfeasance or inappropriate 
performance in office by the prosecutor. 
54. Petitioner has no standing to raise this issue. 
M. Petitioner has been prejudiced in pursuing his 
postconviction relief due to the failure to 
provide costs and fees. 
55. This issue is a legislative decision, not one for 
judicial resolution. 
56. Petitioner's representation herein was superb. 
57. This Court has grave concerns that petitioners 
seeking postconviction relief may not have adequate access to 
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counsel to raise issues that appropriately should be carefully 
reviewed by a court because counsel in postconviction proceedings 
is not provided at taxpayers' expense. The fact that lawyers are 
often constrained to accept the request of a judge to perform pro 
bono services in significant postconviction cases, as was done 
here, is an unfortunate present circumstance; however, it is not 
a matter for judicial resolution. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That, based upon the findings of fact, petitioner 
did not have ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on 
appeal. 
2. That this petition should be and is denied. 
DATED this cffi^day of January, 1992. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
Gregory J. Sanders 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Gregory J. Sanders, 175 East 400 South, Suite 
330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and Ronald J. Yengich, 175 East 
400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for 
petitioner, this l/r day of January, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM MC" 
Order Denying Post-Convict ion Re l i e f 
HLE&BismasTGsyaT 
Third Judicial District 
9 a^AZ 1992 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ^ togw 
Dy 
R. PAUL VAN DAM ( 3 3 1 2 ) CtpuiyCurk 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
N. ELDON BARNES, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 900901405 
Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on May 24, 1991, and August 13, 1991, before the Honorable David 
S. Young. Petitioner, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, was present and 
represented by Gregory J. Sanders and Ronald J. Yengich. 
Respondent was represented by Charlene Barlow and Kirk Torgensen, 
Assistant Attorneys General. The Court having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing 
therefore, it is hereby: 
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denied. 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows; 
1. That the petition for postconviction relief is 
DATED this 7jfff%a^ Tof January, 1992. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Gregory J. Sanders 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Gregory J. 
Sanders, 175 East 400 South, Suite 330, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, and Ronald J. Yengich, 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for petitioner, this \jj day 
of January, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM ••!>•• 
Special Verdict Questions and Form 
SPECIAL VERDICT QUESTIONS 
FIFTH JuuiUiAl biSi Ct/UM 
IRON COUNTY 
F I L E D 
% J AN 2 91988 
OnnxM&lftkdfau CLERK 
Prior to entering your verdict on one of the following 
verdict forms, you are instructed to answer each and all of the 
following Special Verdict Questions: 
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law 
as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant/ Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Richard L. Ernest while the said Joseph 
Mitchell Parsons was engaged in the commission of, or an 
attempt to commit/ or flight after committing or attempting to 
commit Aggravated Robbery. 
_ YES/ we so find unanimously, 
NO/ we are unable to so find unanimously. 
After duly considering the evidence and applying the 
law as instructed/ do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant/ Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Richard L. Ernest for pecuniary gain. 
YES/ we so find unanimously. 
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously. 
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After duly considering the evidence and applying the law as 
instructed/ do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 
Joseph Mitchell Parsons, being a person on parole, knowingly 
possessed or had in his custody or under his control a firearm. 
YES/ we so find unanimously. 
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously. 
DATED this j? tf day of January, 1988. 
T^L?; 
ury Foreperson 
^vc^ 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
** • L E E 
. JAN 2 91988 
ttoinJ fruity
 CL[, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT FORM NO. 1 
Criminal No. 1153 
We the jury impaneled in the above case, unanimously 
render a verdict imposing the sentence of death. 
DATED this 2. ^ day of January, 1988, at Parowan, 
Iron County, Utah. 
JURY FOREPERSON 
<?-<?*• <^<?~ 
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Jury Instruction 14 
INSTRUCTION NO. if 
With respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
the law of the State of Utah provides: 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
The defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the 
death of Richard L. Ernest under any of the following circumstances: 
1. While the said Joseph Mitchell Parsons was engaged 
in the commission of or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery and/or 
2. For pecuniary gain and/or 
3. The said Joseph Mitchell Parsons had previously been 
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
a person. 
You may consider as aggravating circumstances those 
circumstances listed above. 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
1. "The defendant has no significant history of prior 
criminal activity." 
2. "The murder was committed while the defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." 
3. "The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the 
substantial domination of another person." 
4. "At the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the ciminality (wrongfulness) of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law 
9 r ^ 
was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease, 
intoxication or influence of drugs." 
5. "The youth of the defendant at the time of the 
crime." 
6. "Whether the defendant was an accomplice in the 
murder committed by another person and his participation was 
relatively minor. 
7. "Any other fact in mitigation of the penalty." 
The foregoing are direct quotations from the law. In 
stating them to you the Court does not intend to imply that any 
of them are applicable to this case. Whether or not they are 
applicable is for you to determine from all the evidence. 
%s 
ADDENDUM "F" 
Jury Ins truc t ions 15 and 15A 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
You are instructed that Aggravated Robbery is the unlawful 
and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear, and in the course of 
committing the robbery a person uses a firearm or a facsimile of 
a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife, or a deadly weapon. 
You are instructed that "deadly weapon" means anything that 
in the manner of its use or intended use is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury. 
You are instructed that "pecuniary gain" is defined as a 
monetary benefit or financial benefit. 
You are instructed that a person is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense. 
For purposes of this definition, conduct does not constitute a 
substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the 
actor's intent to commit the offense. 
You are further instructed that no defense to the offense of 
attempt shall arise because the offense attempted was actually 
committed, or due to factual or legal impossibility if the 
offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances 
been as the actor believed them to be. 
You are instructed that "flight" is defined as a fleeing. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. /S~ A 
You may also consider as aggravating circumstances 
or mitigating circumstances any other evidence admitted at the 
penalty phase of this trial relating to the nature and circumstances 
of the crime, the defendant's character, background, mental or 
physical condition, and any other facts in aggravation^provided 
they relate to the nature and circumstances of the crime or the 
individual characteristices of the defendant. 
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ADDENDUM "G" 
Jury Instruction 18 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
I have previously instructed you that the State has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the totality of 
the aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of the 
mitigating circumstances in this case and that/ beyond a reasonable 
doubt/ the imposition of the death penalty is justified and 
appropriate in the circumstances of this case. You must find that 
the State has met its burden before you may impose the death 
penalty in this case. 
As an aggravating circumstance in addition to those upon 
which I have previously instructed you/ the State has produced 
evidence that the defendant/ Joseph Mitchell Parsons, committed 
the crime of being a person on parole in possession of a firearm 
in violation of the law of this State. Before you may consider 
evidence.that the defendant possessed a firearm before/ during or 
after he admittedly caused the death of Richard L. Ernest/ you 
must find beyond a reasonable doubt/ that each and every one of 
the following elements has been proven by the evidence: 
1. That the offense, if any, occurred in the State of Utah/ 
2. That the offense/ if any, occurred on or about August 
31/ 1987/ although the exact date is immaterial/ 
3. That the defendant/ Joseph Mitchell Parosn# was on 
parole for a felony, 
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4. That the defendant, knowingly had in his possession or 
under his custody or control, 
5. A firearm. 
You are instructed that the .38 caliber pistol located in 
the glove compartment of the 1906 Dodge Omni is in fact a firearm. 
If you find that each and every element stated has been 
proven by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
may consider the possession of the firearm by the defendant as 
an aggravating circumstance. 
If you find that one or more of these elements has not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may not consider the 
presence of the firearm in the vehicle for any purpose and you 
are hereby instructed, in that case, to ignore and disregard the 
evidence presented regarding the firearm. 
A special verdict question will be given so you can 
state you findings on this question. 
ADDENDUM "H" 
Jury Instruction 27 
H-1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3H 
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of 
your fellow jurors to act as foreperson, who will preside over 
your deliberations and who will sign the verdict to which you 
agree. In this proceeding a unanimous concurrence of all jurors 
is required before a verdict can be reached. Your verdict must 
be in writing and# when found by you, must be returned into 
court. Two verdict forms have been prepared for your consideration 
together with three Special Verdict Questions, which will aid in 
your deliberations, and which must be answered by unanimous finding 
during your deliberations. If the final vote of the jury members 
is "No" or less than a unanimous "Yes" as to any Special Verdict 
Question, then you may not consider the elements of that individual 
question as aggravating circumstances. Your foreperson will sign 
the Special Verdict Questions and the verdict which correctly 
reflects the result of your deliberations. 
The following are the Special Verdict Questions which have 
been prepared for you: 
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law 
as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Richard L. Ernest while the said Joseph 
Mitchell Parsons was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt 
to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit 
Aggravated Robbery. 
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law 
u_o 
283 
as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of Richard L. Ernest for pecuniary 
gain. 
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law 
as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, being a person on parole, 
knowingly possessed or had in his custody or under his control 
a firearm. 
The Verdict forms which will be furnished to you are as 
follows: 
We the jury, duly-empaneled in the above-entitled 
case, unanimously render a verdict imposing the 
sentence of death. 
OR 
We the jury, duly-empaneled in the above-entitled 
case, unanimously render a verdict imposing the 
sentence of life imprisonment. 
Your foreperson will sign the appropriate Verdict form 
urn both forms to the Court. 
DATED this £(9 ~~ day of January, 1988. 
Q>V<*~ 
PHILIP E^ES, DISTRICT JUDGE 
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United States Constitution 
Amendments VI, and XIV 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused*] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
AIZIZJENiyCJM "J-" 
Utah Constitution 
Article I# Sections 1# 5, 7, and 12 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to eryoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship accord-
ing to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against 
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in 
case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ADDENDUM "K" 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 1 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 3 0 1 
§76 -6 -302 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 
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76-5-201. Criminal homicide — Elements — Designations 
of offenses. 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise 
specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another 
human being, including an unborn child. There shall be no cause of action for 
criminal homicide against a mother or a physician for the death of an unborn 
child caused by an abortion where the abortion was permitted by law and the 
required consent was lawfully given. 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the first and second degree, manslaugh-
ter, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his 
will, accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily iiyury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
AJDDJENDZJM " 1^" 
§76-5 -202 
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(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the fol-
lowing circumstances: 
(a) The homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or 
other correctional institution. 
(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of 
conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons are killed. 
(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other 
than the victim and the actor. / 
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the 
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit, aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child, 
object rape, object rape of a child, forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child, 
sexual abuse of a child, child abuse of a child under the age of 14 years, as 
otherwise defined in Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), or aggravated sexual as-
sault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggra-
vated kidnaping, kidnaping, or child kidnaping. 
(e) The homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or prevent-
ing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under 
color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendant's or 
another's escape from lawful custody. 
(f) The homicide was committed for pecuniary or other personal gain. 
(g) The defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person 
to commit the homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract for remu-
neration or the promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide. 
(h) The actor was previously convicted of first or second degree murder 
or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person. For the 
purpose of this paragraph an offense committed in another jurisdiction, 
which if committed in Utah would be punishable as first or second degree 
murder, is deemed first or second degree murder. 
(i) The homicide was committed for the purpose of: (i) preventing a 
witness from testifying; (ii) preventing a person from providing evidence 
or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; (iii) 
retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or partici-
pating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; or (iv) disrupting 
or hindering any lawful governmental function or enforcement of laws. 
(j) The victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a 
candidate for public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is 
related to that official position, act, capacity, or candidacy. 
(k) The victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer, 
executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter, 
judge or other court official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and 
the victim is either on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is 
related to that official position, and the actor knew or reasonably should 
have known that the victim holds or has held that official position. 
(1) The homicide was committed by means of a destructive device, 
bomb, explosive, infernal machine, or similar device which the actor 
planted, hid, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or struc-
ture, or mailed or delivered, or caused to be planted, hidden, concealed, 
mailed, or delivered and the actor knew or reasonably should have known 
that his act or acts would create a great risk of death to human life. 
(m) The homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assum-
ing control of any aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of 
threats or force with intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the 
release of the public conveyance or any passenger, crew member, or any 
other person aboard, or to direct the route or movement of the public 
conveyance or otherwise exert control over the public conveyance. 
(n) The homicide was committed by means of the administration of a 
poison or of any lethal substance or of any substance administered in a 
lethal amount, dosage, or quantity. 
(o) The victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield, 
hostage, or for ransom. 
(p) The actor was under a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence 
of death at the time of the commission of the homicide. 
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, 
cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demon-
strated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily in-
jury of the victim before death. .1 
2) Murder in the first degree is a capital offense. 
ADZ>ENI>ZJM m'Mmm 
§77-22-2 
M-1 
77-22-2. Right to subpoena witnesses and require production of evi-
dence — Contents of subpoena — Interrogation before closed court 
(1) In any matter involving the investigation of a crime, the existence of 
a crime or malfeasance in office or anv criminal conspiracy or activity, the 
attorney general or any county attorney shall have the right, upon applica-
tion and approval of the district court, for good cause shown, to conduct 
an investigation in which the prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel 
their attendance and testimony under oath before any certified court 
reporter, and require the production of books, papers, documents, record-
ings and any other items which constitute evidence or may be relevant to 
the investigation in the judgment of the attorney general or county attor-
ney. 
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the names of possible defendants 
and need only contain notification that the testimony of the witness is 
sought in aid of criminal investigation and state the time and place of the 
examination, which may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdication 
of the prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform the party served that 
he is entitled to be represented by counsel. Witness fees and expenses shall 
be paid as in a civil action. 
(3) The attorney general or any county attorney may make written 
application to any district court and the court may order that interrogation 
of any witness shall be held in secret; that such proceeding be secret; and 
that the record of testimony be kept secret unless and until the court for 
good cause otherwise orders. The court may order excluded from any inves-
tigative hearing or proceeding any persons except the attorneys represent-
ing the state and members of their staffs, the court reporter and the 
attorney for the witness. 
ADDENDUM "1ST" 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 7 
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77-35-7. Rule 7 — Proceedings before magistrate, (a) (1) When a 
summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant shall 
appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(2) When any peace officer or other person shall make an arrest with 
or without a warrant the person arrested shall be taken to a magistrate 
pursuant to section 77-7-19. If a magistrate is not available in such circuit 
or precinct, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available 
magistrate for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed one shall 
be filed without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense. 
(3) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
committed he shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county 
wherein the crime was committed and shall be taken before the proper 
magistrate as provided in these rules. If, for any reason, the person 
arrested cannot be promptly returned to such county, he shall, without 
unnecessary delay, be taken before a magistrate within the county of 
arrest for the determination of bail and released thereon or other appro-
priate disposition. Bail, if taken, shall be returned forthwith to the proper 
magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense together with the record 
made of the proceedings before such magistrate. 
(4) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, 
upon the defendant's first appearance before him, inform the defendant 
(i) Of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy 
thereof to him; 
(ii) Of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the infor-
mation and how he may obtain the same; 
(iii) Of his right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the 
court without expense to him if he is unable to obtain his own counsel; 
(iv) Of his rights concerning bail or other circumstances umier which 
he may obtain pre-trial release; and 
(v) That he is not required to make any statement and that the state-
ments he does make may be used against him in a court of law. 
The magistrate shall thereupon allow the defendant reasonable time and 
opportunity to consult counsel before proceeding further and shall allow 
him to contact any attorney by any reasonable means without delay and 
without fee. 
(b) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magis-
trate shall call upon the defendant to plead. If the defendant enters a plea 
of guilty, he shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided by law. If 
the defendant enters a plea of not guilty, a trial date shall be set and it 
may not be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held in 
accordance with these rules and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(c) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he shall not be called on 
to plead before the committing magistrate. During the initial appearance 
before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a pre-
liminary examination. If the defendant waives his right to a preliminary 
examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall 
forthwith order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate 
shall schedule the preliminary examination. Such examination shall be 
held within a reasonable time, but in any event not later than ten days 
if the defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not later than 
30 days if he is not in custody; provided, however, that these time periods 
may be extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary 
examination shall not be held if the defendant is indicted. 
(d) (1) A preliminary examination shall be held in accordance with the 
rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state 
shall have the burden of proof and be required to proceed first with its 
case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under 
oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-
examine the witnesses against him. If from the evidence a magistrate finds 
probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and 
that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith order, 
in writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district 
court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole 
or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by 
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the mag-
istrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The 
magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order of 
dismissal. The dismissal and discharge shall not preclude the state from 
instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
(2) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of 
either party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require 
witnesses not to converse with each other until the preliminary examina-
tion is concluded. On the request of either party the magistrate may order 
all spectators to be excluded from the courtroom. 
(3) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district 
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall 
forthwith transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and 
records made of the proceedings before tlie magistrate, including exhibits, 
recordings and the typewritten transcript, if made, in the magistrate's 
court. 
(e) Whenever a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the 
sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order. 
(f) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material wit-
ness in a case pending before him will not appear and testify unless bond 
ADDENDUM "O" 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 14 
0 - 1 
77-35-14. Rule 14 — Subpoena, (a) A subpoena to require the attend-
ance of a witness or interpreter before a court, magistrate or grand jury, 
in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution may be issued 
by the magistrate with whom an information is filed, the county attorney 
on his own initiative or upon the direction of the grand jury, or the court 
in which an information or indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court 
in which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the defendant, without 
charge, as many signed subpoenas as the defendant may require. 
(b) A subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to 
appear and testify or to produce in court or to allow inspection of records, 
papers or other objects. The court may quash or modify the subpoena if 
compliance would be unreasonable. 
(c) A subpoena may be served by any person over the age of 18 years 
who is not a party. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the sub-
poena to the witness or interpreter personally and notifying him of the 
contents. A peace officer shall serve any subpoena delivered to him for ser-
vice in his county. 
(d) Written return of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to 
the court and to the person requesting that the subpoena be served, stating 
the time and place of service and by whom service was made. 
(e) A subpoena may compel the attendance of a witness from anywhere 
in the state. 
(f) When a person required as a witness is in custody within the state, 
the court may order the officer having custody of the witness to bring him 
before the court. 
(g) Failure to obey a subpoena without reasonable excuse may be 
deemed a contempt of the court responsible for its issuance. 
(h) Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state, or is so 
ill or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for believing that he will be 
unable to attend a trial or hearing, either party may, upon notice to the 
other, apply to the court for an order that the witness be examined condi-
tionally by deposition. Attendance of the witness at the deposition may be 
compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall be present at the deposition 
and the court shall make whatever order is necessary to effect such attend-
ance. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 16 
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77-35-16. Rule 16 — Discovery, (a) Except as otherwise provided, the 
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material 
or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or 
co-defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable fol-
lowing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. 
The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall dis-
close to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating 
to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence which the court deter-
mines on good cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in 
order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided,-the defense attorney shall make all dis-
closures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has 
a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense 
may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and 
information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable 
times and places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that dis-
covery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other 
order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit 
the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a writ-
ten statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an 
order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text 
of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of 
the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an 
appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought 
to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this 
rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not 
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the cir-
cumstances. 
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